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Introduction 
Paul Keating wants to be remembered. The twenty fourth Prime Minister of 
Australia has been remembered for his wonderful political theatre in 
Parliament, his biting insults of the Opposition, his Zegna suits, even his love of 
clocks and the classical composer Gustav Mahler. But what he really wants to 
be remembered for is superannuation. Superannuation is Paul Keating‟s baby. 
While it was not specifically named in his „big picture‟ – the political vision that 
included making Australia a republic, reconciliation with Australia‟s 
indigenous population and furthering economic and cultural ties with Asia – it 
was, in Keating‟s mind, the underpinning policy that could make his big picture 
possible (National Archives, 2009). Superannuation was to be the foundation of 
Keating‟s vision for the Australian nation.  
The term superannuation is not widely used outside of Australia and New 
Zealand. In the United States, similar schemes are referred to as retirement 
plans, whereas in the United Kingdom they are commonly called pension 
schemes (Kingston, 2003, p. 204). Regardless of the variety of names employed, 
the basic principle of superannuation schemes remains the same – to provide an 
amount of money for workers to live comfortably after they have retired 
(Podger, 1986, p. 75). Prior to the Keating years, the superannuation landscape 
in Australia looked markedly different. The first retirement support system in 
Australia was implemented in 1909. While similar schemes had existed in 
different forms in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland since 1900, it was 
not until 1909 that a pension system was applied federally. The policy was a 
means tested, flat-rate public pension of £26 per year (ABS, 1988). This public 
pension system expanded over a forty year period to include specialised 
pensions and benefits for widows, the sick and the unemployed (ABS, 1988). 
While this public pension was a universal (although means tested) benefit, there 
was also a separate way for individuals to prepare for retirement that existed 
alongside this public pension. An individual could put money into a fund 
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which would grow this money and return it to the individual come retirement. 
These funds were initially known as private pension funds, but gradually came 
to be called private superannuation funds. The problem with these early private 
superannuation funds was that they were far from common place, and were 
usually restricted to high income white collar workers in the public sector or 
employees of large corporations that offered this service (APRA, 2007, p. 3). 
Thus by 1974, only 32% of the national workforce was covered by the 
superannuation system (ABS, 1974, p. 544). The Hawke Labor Government 
sought to rectify this situation somewhat during the 1980s, with the 
introduction of institutionalised employee superannuation which was tied to 
industrial awards. While this proved to be successful, as it led to an increase in 
the rate of superannuation coverage to 64% of the workforce by 1990, it still had 
numerous problems (Nielson & Harris, 2010). To begin with, it still left a large 
portion of the Australian workforce uncovered. Also, the system was rather 
complicated, with many employees who were entitled to superannuation not 
receiving it due to compliance issues. And finally, the contribution amount of 
3% was too small to make much of an impact on an individual‟s retirement 
income (APRA, 2007, pp. 3-4). Whilst Australia‟s superannuation system had 
come a long way since 1909, by the beginning of the 1990s Australia was left 
with a complicated, poor performing and unequal system. 
By the time he was Prime Minister, Paul Keating had proved to be a fiery 
political operator. He entered politics at the age of twenty and by the age of 
twenty four, he had already fought several political battles at the local council 
level. By the age of twenty five, he was the sitting Labor member for Blaxland, a 
seat in his home town of Bankstown, South West Sydney. It was not until after 
the fall of the Whitlam government in 1975, however, that Keating entered the 
front bench. For eight years, he honed his political skills as an Opposition front 
bencher before becoming Treasurer under the Hawke government, elected in 
1983 (NMA, 2009). Keating had not been formally educated in economics. In 
fact, compared to his political counterparts, he had fairly little education at all. 
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He left school after year 10 and never went to University. Yet despite this lack 
of formal education, Keating had a keen understanding of how things worked, 
and in no area was this more prevalent than economics (Watson, 2002, p. 59). 
This made him the perfect match for the role of Treasurer, and he executed that 
role with vigour. During his time as Treasurer, Keating oversaw a string of 
major economic reforms that would bring Australia into line with a new type of 
economic thinking. Between 1983 and 1991, Keating (with Hawke) ushered in 
the floating of the Australian dollar, the reduction of protectionist tariff policies, 
and the introduction of a new form of labour market interaction called 
enterprise bargaining as well as a new Accord reached with the trade unions 
(National Archives, 2009). These reforms were big changes for the small 
Australian nation as they marked a move away from government-provided 
certainty, to individual-owned risk. It was Keating‟s political magic and media 
charm that convinced both the Parliament and the Australian public that these 
reforms were the way to take Australia into the future (Love, 2008, pp. 75-82).  
Keating‟s rise from Treasurer to Prime Minister had been far from bloodless. As 
political manoeuvres go, it was as delicate as a performance of Mahler‟s 
Symphony Number 3 in D Minor played on a gum leaf. Rather than a swift 
overnight coup, this leadership challenge lasted for months. Keating first 
challenged the sitting Prime Minister Bob Hawke for the leadership in June 
1991. Keating had believed the position was rightfully his. The Labor caucus 
had other ideas, and the spill failed. Six months later, in December 1991, with 
growing support this time from his Labor teammates as they watched the 
political landscape change to one in need of economic integrity, Keating again 
challenged Hawke. This time he was successful (Watson, 2002, pp. 19-21; 
National Archives, 2009).  
The achievements of Paul Keating the Prime Minister read quite different from 
that of Paul Keating the Treasurer. Whether time had changed him, or the 
company he kept influenced him, the economic reform program that had 
defined his time as Treasurer was replaced by something different – a grander 
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vision for the nation. Where his previous policies sought to push Australia 
towards a free market neo-liberal world orthodoxy, his policies as Prime 
Minister sought to temper this extreme in an effort to strike a balance between 
free market ideas and government support, between efficiency and equity 
(National Archives, 2009). It was out of this new found thinking that the 
Keating model of superannuation emerged in 1992. Unlike the superannuation 
models of the past, this new model would unite superannuation. The Keating 
proposal had three pillars. The first, a safety net of sorts, was the government 
funded pension. This was a means-tested sum of money paid to retirees that 
would help if the second and third pillars failed. Pillar two, the linchpin of this 
new model, was the Superannuation Guarantee. This was a government 
mandated compulsory contribution by employers into employee‟s 
superannuation funds which would start at 3% of an employee‟s income and, in 
time, reach 15% of an employee‟s income. The third pillar was voluntary 
contributions by employees into their own superannuation funds, with tax 
incentives to promote this option (Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) 
Act, 1992). Together, the three pillars would create a robust superannuation 
system to replace the complex and unequal superannuation system of the past. 
But the Keating superannuation proposal was grander than this; it was a vision 
for a better Australia. I argue that the promise of the superannuation proposal 
was that it would be good for the nation and good for the people. Keating‟s 
reforms as Treasurer had laid the groundwork for this policy that would not 
only create a more comfortable life for Australian workers, but catapult the 
Australian nation to the forefront of the modern world.  
The aim of this paper is to analyse this proposal, to understand if Keating‟s 
vision corresponds with the superannuation reality of today. To do so will 
involve unpacking the Keating superannuation proposal and tracing this vision 
almost 20 years on. Once the policy and its context have been established, I will 
analyse what I suggest are the two central claims of the Keating proposal: that it 
is good for the nation and good for the people.  
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It is important to note here the different approach I take to the history of the 
Australian superannuation system. Much of the current literature which looks 
at the history of superannuation in Australia does so by indentifying pragmatic 
motivators (see: Jones, 2008; Bateman & Ablett, 2000; Barrett & Chapman, 2001; 
Brewer & Boyle, 1996). For instance, the current literature places 
superannuation in the context of the government‟s desire to deal with wage 
increases and strongly related to this, the desire to quash inflation as a result of 
these wage increases. In simple terms, the 1980s in Australia were marred by 
something economists call wage-push inflation, a process whereby a rapid 
increase in wages leads to an increase in inflation. The Keating Superannuation 
policy put an end to this inflation spiral as wage increases were offset by 
superannuation contributions from employers, meaning workers still received a 
wage increase of sorts, but it did not negatively impact upon inflation. Another 
approach seen in the literature is to view the implementation of superannuation 
simply as a means to take the pressure off the federal budget, which struggling 
to provide public pensions to a growing and ageing population. 
These are valid and accurate readings of the history of superannuation in 
Australia, but I believe they are also too simplistic. They neglect to identify 
larger themes that underpin the desire to implement the superannuation 
system. As such, this paper will seek to re-embed these grand overarching 
motivators into the history of the superannuation system in Australia, and to 
analyse what I see as the two crucial big ideas, good for the nation and good for 
the people, which prompted the system to be implemented in the first place 
In „good for the nation‟ I will address the two claims made of the 
superannuation policy which purported to help build and protect the nation. 
The first was the idea that, due to the large pool of savings generated out of the 
compulsory Superannuation Guarantee, Australia‟s economy would be 
protected from external market shocks. The rationale here being that with 
access to national savings, the urge or requirement to borrow funds from 
overseas would be diminished. The second claim was that this pool of national 
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savings would be used to invest in nation building infrastructure projects, 
helping to create a better nation, as well as allowing superannuation funds to 
receive a consistent return on their investment. Both of these claims have 
proven to be incorrect. The nature of global financial markets has meant that the 
mere fact of having national savings does not protect national economies, and 
individuals will also continue to borrow overseas regardless of being able to 
access domestic funds. Likewise, the minor amounts that superannuation funds 
currently invest in infrastructure are barely of any significance and do little to 
assist with nation building. 
„Good for the people‟ will analyse the macro effect superannuation has had for 
individual workers. This chapter will also analyse two claims made of the 
superannuation policy. The first is the notion that superannuation was meant to 
be simple and easy for individual Australians, unlike the disjointed and 
complicated systems of the past. The second claim was that individuals would 
have a larger retirement income via the use of a superannuation model which 
utilised the private sector to invest an individual‟s retirement savings into the 
marketplace. Like the claims in the „good for the nation‟ chapter, these claims 
also prove to be inaccurate. Rather than create a simple and easy to use system, 
Australia‟s superannuation system has turned out to be overly complex, 
requiring a great deal of financial knowledge in order to reap the most 
economic benefit. Instead of providing a retirement scheme which balanced 
efficiency and equity, Australia is left with a two-tiered system, with the 
majority of Australians being worse off. The system has also failed to fulfil the 
promise to provide larger retirement incomes to workers. This comes down to 
issues with the cost, security and general fund performance of the system. 
The final section will take the above analysis and assess whether the promised 
vision could actually occur, by contrasting the Keating proposal with the 
recommendations set out in the Cooper Review of superannuation. In August 
2009, a review panel was convened, headed by Jeremy Cooper, to look into the 
state of Australian superannuation. On June 30 2010 this review was completed. 
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It outlines the direction superannuation should take, presenting possible policy 
options to address the issues with the current superannuation system. This 
section will assess whether these policy recommendations assist with making 
superannuation fit with Paul Keating‟s original vision that superannuation 
would be, as I term it, good for the nation and good for the people.  
Paul Keating envisaged a different Australia. An Australia where personal 
savings not only meant individuals could retire comfortably without putting 
great strain on the federal budget, but where those same personal savings could 
help build a better nation - creating new infrastructure and investment into new 
industries, all while preventing Australia from being held to the whims of 
global finance. I will show, through an investigation of the Keating proposal 
and the way it played out over a twenty-year period, that this vision did not 
come true. I will demonstrate that the poorly implemented superannuation 
system created by Keating and distorted by subsequent governments is at a 
point where it fails to live up to the promise. In its current form, 
superannuation is not good for the nation and it is not good for the people. The 
Keating vision was a noble one, a vision worth moving towards. Whether that 
vision is now possible, given the current state of superannuation in Australia, is 
yet to be determined.   
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Chapter One: Paul Keating’s 
Superannuation System – A History 
1992 was a busy year in Australian politics. George Herbert Walker Bush 
became the first United States President to address the Australian Parliament. 
The Mabo decision, a High Court challenge in favour of Indigenous land rights 
was passed. And the Australian Head of State, Queen Elizabeth II visited 
Australia, leading the British press to dub the Prime Minister Paul Keating the 
“Lizard of Oz” after he broke protocol and touched the Queen‟s back. Amidst 
all of this political excitement a new policy was being developed. At the end of 
the year, the Keating government unveiled the new policy, the Superannuation 
Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992. The policy created a three pillar system of 
superannuation in Australia. The first pillar took the form of the public pension 
system, a means tested payment to act as a safety net. The third pillar would be 
individual contributions, with tax incentives to make this option attractive. 
However, the main drawcard of Keating‟s new Superannuation policy was the 
second pillar, the Superannuation Guarantee. The Superannuation Guarantee is 
a compulsory payment by employers into the privately managed fund of an 
employee‟s choice. This tax deductible compulsory payment was initially set at 
3% in 1992 and was to be increased to 9% by 2002, with a potential increase up 
to 15% as economic conditions improved (ATO, 2010). This second pillar would 
ensure all Australian workers were saving for retirement and as such produce 
equality within the system. 
While the Keating superannuation system was a new initiative for Australia, it 
was not entirely unique on a global level. Twelve years earlier, the South 
American Nation of Chile had become the first nation to implement such a 
system. In 1973 Augusto Pinochet, with the United States backing, led a coup 
d‟état to take control of Chile. With the world economy in bad shape, Pinochet 
set about implementing new policies to pull Chile out of the global economic 
slump. He was aided by a group of economists known as the „Chicago Boys‟, 
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led by one Milton Friedman (New School, 2003). Friedman had been a pioneer 
of the free market approach to economics which favoured free and open trade 
and financial markets with limited government intervention (Roberts, 2008). 
The seven years to 1980 saw the Chicago Boys liberalise much of the Chilean 
economy. By 1980, they had turned their sights to the Chilean pension system, a 
system of funds with the same level of complexity and inefficiency as the 
Australian system had portrayed (Ruiz-Tagle, 1997, pp. 4-6). The solution was 
to implement an entirely privately run pension system where individuals had 
to contribute 13% of their salary to a private pension fund (Ruiz-Tagle, 1997, p. 
7). The Keating system, while in no way directly linked, shares many 
similarities to the Chilean model. They both utilise the private sector to run the 
system, and both employ compulsion as a means to ensure uniformity 
throughout the system. There is a slight difference in execution however, as the 
Chilean system puts the onus of saving onto the employee, whereas the Keating 
system puts that onus on the employer. Regardless, the outcome of both models 
is the same, with individuals having personal superannuation accounts which 
require compulsory contributions.  
Even though the Keating superannuation system and the Chilean system from 
the 1980s share much in common, there is no suggestion that Paul Keating 
implemented the Australian superannuation system as a result of the Chilean 
experience. On the contrary, the Australian superannuation system is very 
much a product of Keating‟s own world view. Paul Keating was a Labor man 
through and through.  As the son of a trade union official, Paul Keating 
believed strongly in the labour movement, which has a long and rich heritage in 
Australia. His political idol and former New South Wales premier, Jack Lang, 
was, for Keating, the epitome of the labour movement. Lang‟s politics clearly 
influenced Paul Keating, so much so that between 1962 and 1964, Keating met 
with Lang on a weekly basis to talk politics (National Archives, 2009). Jack 
Lang‟s state government was highly involved in the economy and, as such, the 
lives of working men and women. Lang spent a lot of government resources on 
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building and fixing public infrastructure, while also setting up free, state run 
high schools, improving welfare systems and implementing worker injury 
compensation policies (Nairn, 2006). Keating admired this type of government 
involvement in the lives of Australian workers, and the nation (or in this case 
New South Wales) as a whole. However, the ideals of big government and 
strong unions combined with working class roots were not all that influenced 
Paul Keating. While his father, Matthew Keating, was a union official, he was 
also the owner of a successful engineering business, making equipment for the 
ready mix concrete industry. The business was small to begin with, but grew 
quite large, even spawning off its own ready mix concrete company. Even 
though Paul Keating never showed any great interest in taking over the 
business himself, his father passed on to him “a respect for markets and the 
merits of honest business activity” (Love, 2008, p. 57). The result of this meant 
that Keating had two very powerful influences in his life, a commitment to the 
labour movement and an understanding and appreciation for the market and 
the private sector.  
By the 1980s, the political landscape had changed dramatically from the days of 
Jack Lang. The idea of big government was no longer possible; rather, a more 
subtle, compromising approach was required. Bob Hawke, the Australian 
Prime Minister from 1983-1991, was the man best suited to these conditions. He 
exemplified the idea of the politics of inclusion, or as many at the time referred 
to it, „Hawke‟s Big Tent‟ (Ryan & Bramston, 2003, pp. 112-114). He was able to 
effectively juggle multiple interest groups and work towards compromise. With 
Hawke at the helm, the Australian nation was primed for big changes. It was 
amidst this atmosphere that Paul Keating and Bill Kelty came together to create 
Australia‟s superannuation system. While much of the credit goes to Keating 
for the system, the role played by Kelty is of vital importance. Bill Kelty was the 
secretary of the Australian Council of Trade Unions for 17 years (ACTU, 2009). 
He was first appointed in 1983, the same year the Hawke government was 
elected. Throughout the 1980s, he worked closely with the then treasurer Paul 
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Keating. While they shared the same social visions, the two men, Keating and 
Kelty, seemed nothing alike. Keating was rarely seen without his signature 
Zegna suit, while Kelty was often seen in jeans and his favourite AFL team 
colours (Love, 2008, p. 88). Despite appearances, Keating and Kelty worked 
well together as Keating brought with him his labour movement roots and 
respect for markets and Kelty brought his strong union heritage and schooling 
in classical economics (Love, 2008, p. 89). Throughout the 1980s, with Keating as 
Treasurer, they laid the ground work for the superannuation system, 
implementing the Prices and Incomes Accord (National Archives, 2009). This 
strong working relationship continued with Keating as Prime Minister, with the 
final implementation of the Australian superannuation system in 1992. 
Together they created a system that appeared to tick all the boxes, which Kelty 
could sell to the union movement and Keating to the Australian people. The 
system had government intervention in the form of compulsory payments, 
while also managing to appease the union movement as well as the market, 
with wage increases occurring, but being offset into privately run 
superannuation funds. Behind all of this, of course, as the driving motivator for 
this reform, was Keating‟s grand vision for Australia, the idea that 
superannuation would be good for the nation and good for the people. 
The implementation of this system, however, was far from perfect. While 
Keating had these big picture ideas of the superannuation policy being good for 
the nation and the people in mind when he created the system, this failed to be 
incorporated into the system‟s implementation. The superannuation system 
was left to be run by private superannuation funds and there was little 
government regulation to ensure Keating‟s promises would be fulfilled. In 1996, 
Paul Keating was removed from office in the worst electoral loss for the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP) since 1934. It was a crushing blow to the ALP that 
would keep them out of office for the next 11 years. It also signalled a change. 
The newly elected Howard Government brought with it a new political idea 
which was based around the rhetoric of choice and the individual. While 
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Keating‟s promised vision of superannuation, that it be good for the nation and 
good for the people, was based on a collective ideology, the Howard 
Government took the approach that it was choice that was of the utmost 
importance, and more specifically, individual choice. This shift towards the 
importance of the individual came at the expense of Keating‟s mantra, to create 
a system which balanced efficiency and equity. The push towards individual 
choice created undue complexity and as such introduced further inequality into 
the system.  Rather than rely on the Superannuation Guarantee, workers were 
persuaded to contribute to their superannuation funds themselves via policies 
such as the superannuation co-contribution scheme where the government 
would contribute a percentage amount of an individual‟s contribution (ATO, 
2010). There were also various tax incentives to promote further individual 
contributions (ATO, 2010). However, the biggest move made in favour of the 
individual choice rhetoric came in 2005 with the implementation of the choice 
of fund legislation (ACCI, 2005). The legislation allowed individuals greater 
choice as to which fund their superannuation contributions would be invested.  
Keating had it written in policy that the Superannuation Guarantee (which set 
the rate of compulsory employer contributions) would be raised to 9% by 2002. 
However, the further rise to 15% which Keating had pushed for as Prime 
Minister, and continued to push for as a political commentator, never occurred 
under Howard. The Howard Government had the opportunity to push this 
through, but instead decided on across-the-board tax cuts, and the introduction 
of the Future Fund, a fund of government budgetary surplus which would be 
used to pay for public sector superannuation (APRA, 2007, p. 6). The funnelling 
of this money off into tax cuts is yet another example of the individual choice 
rhetoric employed by the Howard government. The election of the Rudd Labor 
Government in 2007 did little to help Keating‟s mission to raise the 
Superannuation Guarantee. The Labor Minister for Superannuation Nick 
Sherry, acknowledged Keating‟s desire to have the Superannuation Guarantee 
increased to 15%. He went so far as to call this desire a „dream‟ of Paul 
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Keating‟s. For Keating, this was simply a “failure of imagination” (Anne, 2007). 
Needless to say, there was no increase to the Superannuation Guarantee by the 
Rudd Government during the first few years of its time in office. Of course, the 
validity of this increase in the rate of the Superannuation Guarantee is 
questionable, and a point that will be discussed later. Regardless of the merits 
of this policy, the inaction on this issue represents the general disregard 
towards superannuation in Australia since Keating‟s 1996 election loss. 
The world changed in 2008. At least that is how the media now tells the story. 
The collapse of the investment bank Bear Stearns in March 2008 set off a 
domino effect leading to what has now been termed the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC). The GFC involved a breakdown of financial market systems which 
highlighted the instability of the current financial system. Fuelled by media 
reports that the world was heading into another Great Depression, the GFC 
understandably caused great panic. The financial crisis had a devastating effect 
on Australian superannuation funds. The result meant large losses for many 
individuals‟ superannuation accounts (Graham, 2009). However, it was not 
only the monetary loss which effected superannuation, the GFC also raised 
questions regarding the perception of superannuation as a safe option for 
retirement savings. It also called into question what good superannuation had 
done, if any, for the nation. With these questions and ideas circling, 
superannuation, which had fallen out of vogue both in the minds of politicians 
and everyday Australians, was suddenly back on the front page. A crisis of the 
financial markets had turned a spotlight on a system which was supposed to be 
good for the people and good for the nation but which was failing to achieve 
both. At the beginning of 2010, the Rudd Government announced that the 
Superannuation Guarantee would be increased from 9% to 12%  (Ryan P. , 
2010). This increase was designed to bolster the superannuation system which 
had seen huge losses as a result of the GFC, whether this would achieve the 
desired result however is a point of contention. This was not the only response 
by the Rudd Government in regards to superannuation. Rudd also 
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commissioned the Cooper Review of Superannuation which was handed to 
government in June 2010, outlining changes to superannuation to make it 
simpler and better for the people. Unlike the proposed increase to the 
Superannuation Guarantee, the Cooper Review may have a positive impact on 
the future of superannuation in Australia.   
It has been almost twenty years since Paul Keating introduced Australia‟s 
superannuation system. Looking back over the life of the superannuation policy 
highlights several issues that were present not only from its inception, but also 
from changes to the policy over time, which have led to its failure to live up to 
Keating‟s stated promises. The system as it was originally implemented by 
Keating in 1992 was far from perfect. Taking Keating‟s background into 
account, it is easy to see how Australia got the system it has today. His working 
class background coupled with his respect for the market system played a 
crucial role in how he and Bill Kelty developed and implemented the system. 
Yet it was this very implementation, the use of private firms without strict 
regulations so as to appease and better utilise the market, which led to the 
eventual failure to meet Keating‟s promises that superannuation would be both 
good for the nation and good for the people. The election of the Howard 
Government in 1996, and with it the shift to a rhetoric of individual choice, did 
not help the situation. Rather, the superannuation system, which itself already 
required a high degree of financial knowledge in order to comprehend, became 
even more complicated through the introduction of new choices for individuals. 
The inaction of the Rudd Government until the aftermath of the GFC meant 
that the system, which had already proven to be problematic, was hit hard by 
this economic shock. The resulting reactionary policy to lift the Superannuation 
Guarantee, while garnering industry support, may not have helped anyone but 
the superannuation funds themselves. The next two chapters build upon this 
history and examine how the Keating vision failed. They trace the rationale as 
to why Keating believed superannuation would be good for the nation and 
good for the people, and analyse how and why this has failed to be the case. 
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The history of superannuation in Australia over the past eighteen years is a 
history of poor policy implementation. It is not the ideas that were problematic, 
rather it was the way Keating and subsequent governments administered, and 
then neglected the policy, instead relying on the market mechanism and the 
private sector to run and improve the system. 
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Chapter Two: Good for the Nation 
The first rationale for Keating‟s superannuation policy, which I term good for 
the nation, had its roots in the perceived savings crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. 
The Australian domestic savings level was at an historic low by the beginning 
of the 1990s. As figure 1 shows, during the mid 1970s, the net savings rate1 was 
around 16%. By 1991 this figure had fallen to 2%.  
 
Despite the flux in economic thought at the time, there was a general consensus 
that this poor savings rate needed to improve. There was also a related 
argument that the Current Account Deficit (CAD) should be curtailed - an 
argument that Paul Keating was a keen proponent of. The current account is 
one side of set of national economic statistics known as the Balance of Payments 
(BOP) which records the transactions between a nation and the rest of the world 
(ABS, 2006). The current account records the net earnings (if in surplus) or 
spending (if in deficit) of a nation, and comprises a country‟s balance of trade, 
incomes payable and cash transfers. As figure 2 identifies, Australia‟s current 
                                                          
1
 The net savings rate is calculated by taking the rate of gross savings (resources available for 
investment) and subtracting depreciation (consumption of fixed capital). Source: ABS Measuring 
Australia’s Progress 2002 
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account has historically been in deficit. In fact, Australia‟s CAD has averaged -
4.5% of GDP over the past two decades (Gruen, 2005). 
 
The current account being in deficit is not, in and of itself, a problem. What is 
problematic, however, is the size of the deficit - well, at least it was for Paul 
Keating. Keating was a firm believer that the CAD needed to be controlled, 
especially seeing as Australia had recently entered a new world of financial 
risk, with the Australia dollar having been floated and the banking system 
deregulated in the previous decade. Yet Paul Keating was becoming a lone 
supporter of this economic position. The 1990s was a difficult time for an 
economic policy maker. Economic ideas were swirling around and theoretical 
battles were being fought. What was once believed as gospel was now being 
questioned. For Keating and his senior advisor Don Russell, the gospel stated 
that high CADs were bad. From their offices in Parliament House they would 
argue that something needed to be done to quell the ever increasing debt. But 
sitting in an office on the other side of Lake Burley Griffin, not ten minutes 
away, was an economics professor at the Australian National University who 
would question that very belief. John Pitchford was the economist and in 1989 
he made his views on the CAD clear. Pitchford argued that the CAD was not a 
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cause for concern and should not be the focus of government policy. The reason 
for this drastic departure from previous thought stemmed from new economic 
ideas that put greater emphasis on the efficiency and rationality of individuals 
in the market place. As such, Pitchford stated that the current account 
comprised simply of private transactions between consenting adults who were 
making “considered market judgements” (Bell, 2004, p. 62). And if this was the 
case, then government policy directed at reducing this deficit was not required. 
Pitchford‟s views on the current account took off and led to an almost 
unanimous turn away from the idea that the CAD should be the target of 
government policy, in particular monetary policy. Even the Reserve Bank of 
Australia, which is responsible for monetary policy, was in agreement with 
Pitchford‟s „consenting adults‟ thesis (Bell, 2004, p. 63).  
Keating was furious that his economic advisors had turned against him. It took 
most of 1990, but eventually he came around and agreed that the Reserve Bank 
policy should no longer be to target the CAD and instead they should focus on 
inflation. The result was a defeat for Keating‟s own economic world view, but 
all was not lost. In 1992 Keating unveiled his superannuation policy. You could 
imagine Keating‟s delight as his treasurer, John Dawkins, read out the 
Superannuation Guarantee Bill to the parliament and stated that this new 
compulsory superannuation scheme would “increase overall national savings 
so as to reduce Australian reliance on the savings of foreigners” (Senate 
Standing Committee, 1995). In other words, Keating‟s superannuation policy 
would help to fight the CAD by reducing Australian reliance on foreign savings 
(the income account of the current account). It formed one of the foundations 
for Keating‟s vision that superannuation would be good for the nation. If the 
current account could be held in check, meaning Australian investors were not 
having to borrow offshore, then the Australian economy would be shielded and 
protected from the world of unpredictable and risky financial markets. It is this 
claim that will now be analysed.  
 
 19 
 
Superannuation: protecting the Australian economy 
The idea or rationale that a large pool of superannuation created national 
savings, which currently sits at $1.23 trillion, would shield Australia from 
economic shocks is a simple one (APRA, 2010, p. 5). It is a two part argument. 
Firstly, if the private sector can borrow from a local, national savings pools, 
then they will. Secondly, if the private sector has the ability to do this, then 
Australia‟s net borrowings from overseas (as indicated on the current account) 
will be much lower. The result is that fluctuations in the international economy, 
which may affect the level of debt repayments on borrowed money, will not be 
as problematic for Australia, as individuals will have borrowed from local 
reserves. The problem with this argument is that it is no longer suited to the 
modern world economy. The bedrock on which the above argument rests goes 
back to the balance of payments, in particular the current account. 
The balance of payments has only been in existence for a relatively short period 
of time, having only been officially implemented as a national accounting 
system in the 1920s (Wasserman & Ware, 1965, p. 105). While its history is short, 
it is rather fascinating, especially in the Australian context. The story begins in 
the 1930s, with the focus being on the current account, arguably the most 
important aspect of the balance of payments. Australia, like the rest of the 
world in the 1930s, viewed the current account as an important economic 
indicator, yet one lacking in statistical information to make sound policy 
judgements. (Edwards, 2001, p. 2). The importance of deficits on the current 
account became less and less important as the twentieth century wore on, with 
strong world growth a possible cause for the increasingly relaxed attitude. For 
Australia (and much of the world) the early 1970s marked yet another change in 
government‟s attitude to the current account. As Australia‟s CAD continued to 
increase, there was growing concern that such a large deficit (at that stage 
around 4.5% of GDP (Belkar, Cockerell, & Kent, 2007)) could lead to serious 
issues for the Australian economy (Hawkins & Harris, 2006, p. 61). The 
consequence of this in the 1970s and following on into the 1980s was the idea 
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that such high levels of foreign debt indicated by the CAD were unsustainable. 
What if the foreign lenders all decided to demand their money back? What 
would happen to Australia? These concerns led to a policy decision, 
spearheaded by Paul Keating, to make the CAD a target of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia. A booklet on Australia‟s debt problem put out by Macquarie Bank in 
1989 explains this fear of the CAD: it likened Australia‟s large CAD to a “frog 
immersed in water that was initially cold but was gradually being heated. 
Failing to realise the impending danger, the frog is eventually boiled” (Stevens 
& Hariss, 2004). As explained earlier, this position changed again towards the 
end of 1989 with John Pitchford‟s „consenting adults‟ thesis. Today, balance of 
payments figures are still collected, and the CAD is regularly reported in the 
media, yet it rarely raises any alarm bells – and for good reason. The balance of 
payments, and in particular, the current account, is an outdated form of 
national accounting. The BOP was suitable for a time when governments 
heavily protected trade, currency and financial systems. But in this current age 
of globalisation, characterised by floating currency and unregulated markets, 
this form of national accounting is no longer sufficient (Bryan, 2001, pp. 57-58). 
The major changes in the world economy that have made the BOP an outdated 
form of national accounting are the innovations in financial markets and the 
growth of multi-national corporations. During the 1970s and 1980s, most 
national economies underwent a period of economic liberalisation where their 
currency was floated and banks were deregulated. The result of these 
liberalising reforms was the creation of new types of financial products such as 
derivatives. A derivative is a financial product that „derives‟ its value from 
another asset. Owning a derivative means owning a position on the price 
fluctuation of that asset as opposed to owning the asset itself. The concept of a 
derivative in the financial world is not a new one. In fact derivatives can be 
dated back to the 12th century Flemish traders, and were predominant during 
the 17th century in both Amsterdam (then the financial capital of the western 
world) and the Osaka Rice Market (Bishop, 1996, p. 6). As such, derivatives 
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have a long history in the financial world. What makes current derivates of the 
past two decades different is the volume of trade and the much larger and 
wider range of products one can own a derivative in. The derivative market is 
now so large that total global derivative transactions equalled US$615 trillion 
by the end of December 2009 (Bank for International Settlements , 2010, p. 1). 
The other major area of global economic change was the growth of 
multinational corporations. Like derivatives, the concept of a multinational 
corporation is not new. The Dutch East India Company of the 17th century was 
the first and perhaps the most famous historical example of a multinational 
corporation. A multinational corporation is one that operates in multiple 
countries, often without a strict attachment to a „home‟ country (Hennary, 2000, 
p. 72). Both derivatives and multinational corporations create problems for 
national accounting systems like the BOP and as such call into question the 
validity of Keating‟s argument about superannuation and the protection it 
offers Australia. 
Derivative transactions as well as the movements of multi-national corporations 
are distorting the balance figures on the BOP and more crucially the CAD 
(Kester, 1995, p. 3). The integration of capital markets, of which derivatives play 
a prominent role, as well as the floating of national exchange rates has meant 
that the BOP, once considered the authoritative source of a nations external 
position, is now “merely one way of sorting economic transactions into 
categories that present a balance sheet of residence-based, currency specific 
trade and capital flows” (Julius, 1990, p. 85). In other words, the BOP now tells 
us very little about a nation‟s economic position. Take the following example 
regarding derivatives. Kangaroo Bonds are a form of derivatives defined as 
debt securities issued by non-residents in the Australian domestic market (ABS, 
2006). These bonds are predominantly bought by domestic Australians. Where 
this becomes interesting is how these bonds show up on the BOP. While they 
should show up as a debit on the financial account, there is a growing argument 
that instead they show up as debit on the current account due to a mistake in 
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accounting practices, artificially inflating the CAD, and distorting the national 
accounts (Statistics New Zealand, 2008). Multinational corporations are also 
responsible for this distortion. To better understand how they affect national 
accounts look at the following example. Imagine a company that is based 
within the United States, but is also present in other countries. This company is 
performing quite poorly in the United States, yet in Australia, a country where 
this company also operates, it is performing outstandingly and producing 
record profits. Given this scenario, it is difficult to determine what this means 
for Australia‟s economic performance, and what this means for the United 
States‟ economic performance. In fact, all we can really tell is the performance of 
a United States corporation in specific areas around the world. And therein lies 
the problem with current national accounting procedures. The performance of 
this company would have shown up on both sets of national accounts and yet, 
for the nation itself, it means very little (Lipsey & Kravis, 1992, p. 74).  
What both of these examples of derivatives and multinational corporations 
demonstrate is that current national accounting methods are flawed. This is of 
vital importance to understand when analysing the claim that superannuation 
can help protect Australia from external economic shocks. The Keating claim is 
based around the perceived danger of a high CAD.  For Keating, a large CAD 
means that Australia is borrowing at large amounts offshore, which puts people 
in danger should international situations change. As such, argues Keating, the 
introduction of national savings as a result of the Superannuation Guarantee 
would lower the CAD. But as shown, these current account figures are no 
longer accurate. They are distorted by new financial products or the movements 
of multinational corporations. So a high CAD may not actually mean anything 
given this highly interconnected global economic environment in which we 
live. As such, the premise on which Keating based this claim is inaccurate. This 
is not to say that Australian investors have not utilised this national pool of 
savings at all – they have and they do. However, it is wrong to connect the use 
of these funds with the idea that Australians would use up these funds before 
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borrowing overseas and as such claim that this national pool of savings is 
protecting Australia. In fact, the moment foreign exchange controls were 
relaxed in Australia, Australians, including private pension funds, insurance 
companies and investment trusts all began to borrow and invest heavily 
overseas (Anil & Daly, 2004, p. 2). Figure 3 highlights this rapid increase in net 
foreign debt (demonstrating the amount borrowed or invested by private 
individuals internationally) which saw a dramatic increase from 6% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in 1980, before foreign exchange controls were 
introduced, to 32.9% of GDP by 1990.  
 
This investment and borrowing from overseas has continued to rise since the 
1990s, with several investments banks as well as private individuals regularly 
raising funds (in other words borrowing money) overseas to fund investment, 
despite Australia‟s national pool of savings generated from the Superannuation 
Guarantee (Chong, 2003; Manning, 2009, p. 159). What this demonstrates is that 
in a globally connected world, people will seek out the cheapest means to 
borrow funds, even if that means borrowing overseas. So, national accounting 
figures are incorrect and Australians also continue to borrow from overseas at 
high levels, despite national savings. This means that claiming that 
superannuation produces a national pool of savings which protects Australia 
Figure 3. Level of Net Foreign Debt as a Percentage of GDP. Source: Australia's Foreign 
Debt and Trends, Parliamentary Library, 2009 
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from international economic shocks is incorrect. In this sense then, it would be 
fair to say that superannuation has not proven to be good for the nation. 
Superannuation and Infrastructure 
While claims that superannuation would be good for the nation by protecting 
Australia from international economic shocks have proven to be incorrect, there 
is another argument for the national benefits of superannuation. For Paul 
Keating, the Australian nation was at a point where it needed to expand. 
Australia had been plunged head first into a new financial environment, and 
while this new world of free markets, floating currency and unregulated 
banking was more risky than the relatively risk free world of old, it also came 
with new opportunities. Keating‟s vision was to see innovative investment into 
new industries and new infrastructure within Australia. Unlike his mentor, Jack 
Lang, Keating was unable to rely solely upon government funding to achieve 
this goal. Shifting views on government spending and a tightening of fiscal 
policy, meant that the government option was no longer a possibility. The 
solution then was for this new investment to be undertaken by the private 
sector. The 1992 Superannuation Policy provided the vehicle for this process. 
National savings would be increased, creating a national pool of funds from 
which the private sector could borrow and invest in these big picture visions 
that Keating had.  
The reason Keating thought events would play out in this fashion had to do 
with his involvement in helping create the success of an Australian investment 
giant, known then as Hill Samuel Australia. Hill Samuel Australia started out in 
1969 as a small merchant bank, a subsidiary of the London investment bank Hill 
Samuel & Co. Australia in the 1970s, like much of the world, was a closed 
economy with a fixed exchange rate, a regulated banking system and tightly 
regulated foreign exchange controls. All of this was liberalised by Keating as 
Treasurer during the Hawke Government years in the 1980s. This turned out to 
be a stroke of good fortune for the small merchant bank of Hill Samuel 
Australia. They applied to become a trading bank and were given a licence by 
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the treasurer Paul Keating in 1985. In light of becoming only the second private 
trading bank in Australia‟s history, Hill Samuel Australia changed their name 
to Macquarie Bank after Governor Lachlan Macquarie, the Governor of New 
South Wales who oversaw the transformation of Australia‟s penal colony into a 
thriving economy (Macquarie Bank, 2009). The granting of this licence by 
Keating was all part of his vision to see superannuation savings used as the 
building blocks of a better nation. During the 1980s Keating was setting the 
stage. On one hand he ushered in the economic and financial reforms described 
above. And with the other he worked with Bill Kelty and the Union movement 
to put in place the superannuation system. In the 1990s, with Keating as Prime 
Minister and his stage set, he opened the curtains. The private superannuation 
funds set up under the 1992 Superannuation Policy were now being filled with 
the savings of millions of Australian workers. Macquarie Bank, now firmly 
established as a trading bank, was ready to do business. Macquarie Bank 
needed funds, and the superannuation funds needed somewhere to invest. 
Macquarie Bank took the money and created new infrastructure all over 
Australia – toll roads, power stations, by-passes and even an airport (Love, 
2008, p. 107). Macquarie made a fortune with the specially packaged financial 
products they used to fund, build and sell these developments. Likewise, the 
superannuation funds made a steady and relatively risk free return on their 
investment.  
Unfortunately, history did not continue to play out in this way. As 
superannuation funds continued to increase in size, they began to diversify 
their investments beyond infrastructure and towards more risky, yet potentially 
more rewarding investments in share holdings and new financial products such 
as derivatives. Today, the state of investment in Australian infrastructure by 
superannuation funds is looking dire. As an aggregated figure, superannuation 
funds invest 3.1% of member funds into infrastructure (Ferguson, 2008). 
However, that figure also includes international infrastructure investment, so 
the standalone Australian figure is smaller still. I canvassed a selection of 
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Australian superannuation funds to see how they dealt with investment in 
Australian infrastructure. Today, superannuation funds see infrastructure as an 
„alternative‟ investment option, which is split apart from the „normal‟ 
investment options such as shares, property, fixed interest securities and cash 
(ESS Super, 2010, p. 21). Infrastructures status as an „alternative‟ investment 
option is made clear when looking at amounts invested in particular sectors. 
Figure 4 shows the proportion of assets held by superannuation funds in their 
default accounts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Take for instance an example from Colonial First State Super. Colonial First 
State Super is a „retail‟ or wholesale master trust fund, which means it is a 
superannuation fund run by a financial institution (ASFA, 2010). Retail funds, 
like that of Colonial First State Super, are the largest form of superannuation 
funds in Australia (APRA, 2010, p. 5). Figure 5 (next page) details a graphical 
representation of the proportion of members in each superannuation fund type.   
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Colonial Super invests a total of around $4 million in Australian Infrastructure. 
In contrast, in just one „share‟ investment fund, they invest $161 million 
(Colonial First Choice Super, 2010). There is a similar trend with other retail 
super funds. For example, a fund like AXA invests very little in infrastructure, 
and when they do it is usually an investment in an infrastructure fund or trust 
which packages up a small amounts of Australian infrastructure with a very 
large amount of international infrastructure (Macquarie, 2010, p. 1) (AXA, 2009, 
p. 9). The same can be said for the superannuation accounts managed by AMP, 
which also invests only small amounts in infrastructure. However AMP does 
have some direct investments in infrastructure, via the AMP Capital Investors 
fund, which owns 50% of Melbourne Airport (Ferguson, 2008). The trend differs 
slightly however when looking at Industry Superannuation funds which are 
run by a particular industry or union. Although they are the second largest 
fund type in Australia, they are a very distant second from retail 
superannuation funds (APRA, 2010). When canvassing a selection of industry 
superannuation funds, it is clear that these funds invest more in Australian 
infrastructure than their retail fund counterparts. For instance Australian Super 
invests 14% of member funds into Infrastructure (Australian Super, 2009). The 
Construction and Building Industry Super Fund also invests more prominently 
in Australian infrastructure, with large stakes in the Motorway 4 and Motorway 
52%
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Figure 5. Percentage of Members per Fund type. Source: APRA, Annual Superannuation Bulletin, 2009 
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5 in New South Wales, as well as the Citylink motorway in Victoria (CBUS, 
2006). While these investments are larger than retail funds, they are still 
proportionately small compared to the amount of member funds invested 
elsewhere. 
This snapshot of the current superannuation situation demonstrates a failure of 
the original 1992 promise. Superannuation funds are no longer investing 
substantially in Australian infrastructure and as such it can no longer be 
claimed that superannuation is good for the nation. It is important here to 
address an evolution of policy ideas on this issue. The Howard and Rudd 
government have, without actually stating this, admitted that superannuation is 
no longer good for the nation in this sense. Australia has seen this via the 
introduction and use of the Future Fund, as well as the commissioning of policy 
papers into how superannuation can better work for infrastructure. The Future 
Fund was introduced by the Howard Government in 2006 in response to 
concerns about an ageing population and the strain this would have on the 
federal budget in having to pay out public sector superannuation (Future Fund, 
2009). In 2008 the Rudd Government amended the purpose of the Future Fund 
so that it now also acted as a nation building fund (Future Fund, 2009). This 
meant that money in the Future Fund would be invested in Australian 
infrastructure projects. A good example of the use of these funds was the 
proposal for a new broadband network, known now as the National Broadband 
Network (NBN). The NBN would use funds from the Future Fund to lay fibre 
optic cable to 93% of Australian households (NBN Co, 2010). By doing this, the 
Rudd Government essentially bypassed superannuation funds and instead 
sought to use federal funding, in combination with some private enterprise, in 
order to fund this large infrastructure project. 
This is, of course, in stark contrast to the way Keating envisioned infrastructure 
projects being funded in Australia. In the case of the NBN, the federal 
government could have issued bonds for superannuation funds to invest in, 
providing the government with the funds for development whilst also 
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providing superannuation funds with a steady, long term return. What this 
example demonstrates is a failure of the system. In order to fund the NBN, one 
of the largest infrastructure projects in Australia‟s history, government was not 
willing to push for this form of infrastructure funding and superannuation 
funds were not demanding this form of investment. Another example of the 
implicit acceptance of this systemic failure is the government backed policy 
documents into how superannuation can better work for infrastructure. For 
example, in 2005 the NSW and Victorian state governments launched a new 
organisation known as Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (IPA). The purpose 
for creating this organisation was to create links between funding bodies and 
infrastructure projects. In April of 2010, IPA released a report titled: The Role of 
Superannuation in Building Australia’s Future. The report began with an 
admission that while superannuation should be the perfect fit for infrastructure 
funding, it has thus far failed at the task, with only a few funds being truly 
involved in infrastructure development (IPA, 2010, p. 8). The rest of the report 
investigates how superannuation funds can be encouraged to invest in 
infrastructure, as it is clear that the „national good‟ argument has not been 
sufficient. 
These examples strike at the heart of the issue. The policy implemented in 1992 
was such that it was never going to be able to live up to the promises made. 
Now in 2010, Australia has an alarming shortage of funds for infrastructure 
development (IPA, 2010, p. 9). The 1992 policy put forward a model in which 
private superannuation funds were, in a sense, running the show from that 
point onwards. To assume that these private entities would invest for the 
national good (even though it may make economic sense) was naïve. 
Superannuation funds, in particular the retail funds which also have 
shareholders to contend with, have increasingly sought new and innovative 
ways to invest their money, with hopes of large returns. There is no overall 
government regulation on superannuation funds dictating where they are to 
invest member funds (Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act, 1993). 
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Despite this, most superannuation funds invest a large proportion of their 
default portfolio (the fund to which most members subscribe) into Australian 
shares, equities and cash, with the argument that this type of investment is 
good for Australia. As such, they can claim that they already fulfil the 
requirement to be good for the nation. However, it can be argued that an 
investment in many Australian shares, or Australian asset backed securities, can 
hardly be called „Australian‟ for the same reasons outlined in part one above on 
the BOP. Financial market transactions mean that these products are distorted 
due to their lack of a „national‟ home. Consequently, it can be seen that the only 
way superannuation funds can be truly good for the nation would be 
investment in infrastructure. Such investments, while potentially sending small 
profits overseas, would still largely be advantageous as they create a public 
good both in, and for, Australia. Yet without the necessary regulation to enforce 
this, these privately run superannuation funds have chosen different 
investment options at the expense of nation building, and subsequently, at the 
expense of Keating‟s 1992 promise. 
Both of Keating‟s ideas as to why superannuation would be good for the nation 
have not lived up to the promise. The ideas themselves were not bad – the 
vision itself was a noble one - yet the system which was put in place to carry out 
these ideas was fundamentally flawed. Concepts such as of the Balance of 
Payments can no longer be used to judge a nation‟s economic performance or 
implement accurate policy. Likewise private individuals will not voluntarily 
borrow from national savings when they can receive cheaper borrowing rates 
elsewhere in the world. In this instance, the nationalist ideals of the 
superannuation system were not in keeping with the globalised nature of the 
current world economy. In terms of national investment, the establishment of 
private funds devoid of any regulation to invest in specific infrastructure or 
industry meant that rather than invest in these areas, these private 
superannuation funds elected share holdings and new financial products as 
their go to investment options. Whilst it may have meant greater short term 
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gains for superannuation funds, superannuation has not helped the nation in 
the way Keating intended it would. The poor implementation of Keating‟s 
superannuation vision has meant that, in its current form, superannuation is 
not good for the nation. 
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Chapter Three: Good for the People 
Chapter two demonstrated that superannuation in its current form cannot be 
said to be good for the nation. It fails to live up to the two stated arguments in 
defence of this position. However, the Australian superannuation system 
cannot be seen as a failure simply because of this. There was another, arguably 
more important promise made of the 1992 superannuation vision and this was 
that superannuation would be good for the people. Like the good for the nation 
claim, good for the people also consists of two main arguments. The first 
regards ease and simplicity. Superannuation pre-1992 was a complex and 
complicated system of private pension funds with no real link between any of 
them. There was no Australian superannuation system per se. The introduction 
of Keating‟s Superannuation Guarantee in 1992 created the three pillar system 
that Australia has today, and as such Australia finally had a unified 
superannuation system. An argument for this move was that it would simplify 
the superannuation system. Without much thought from the individual, he or 
she would be allocated a superannuation fund to which 3% and eventually a 
minimum of 9% employer contributions would be contributed. That individual 
could then rest assured that over the course of their working life, they would be 
accruing superannuation so that when that individual retired they could retire 
comfortably. The second argument for why superannuation would be good for 
the people was the idea that it would allow individuals to retire with a large 
retirement income, reducing pressure on the federal budget by way of 
decreased public pensions and allowing individuals to have a better quality of 
life during retirement. The argument here was that by investing an individual‟s 
superannuation contributions in the newly deregulated market place, 
superannuation funds would be able to grow an individual‟s pool of retirement 
funds, adding to the contributions from the individual and the employer over 
the course of their working life. The problem with this and the previous claim is 
that they are not true. The purpose of this chapter is to explain how and why 
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this is the case and to demonstrate why superannuation in its current state is 
not good for the people. 
Simpler Super 
A simpler superannuation system sounded like a very good idea. And what 
could be simpler than a compulsory contribution from an employer into an 
employee‟s superannuation account? This system would ensure that all 
workers, even those who could not take part in the third pillar of individual 
contributions, would have some form of income for their retirement. In reality 
however, this system has proved to be far from simple. There are two 
intertwined reasons as to why superannuation is not as simple and easy as was 
promised. The first has to do with the complexity of superannuation funds 
growing out of the choice given to the individual. And the second has to do 
with the assumed knowledge of individuals, with the burden of risk for future 
retirement savings shifted from the government to the individual.  
When the superannuation policy was rolled out in 1992, employers and union 
were the ones who made the decision as to which fund an employee‟s 
superannuation contributions were to be invested. Employees had no real input 
into this process but were simply informed of the pre-allocated fund (Fry, 
Heaney, & McKeown, 2007, p. 267). The rationale for this policy 
implementation was to keep superannuation simple. Employees would be 
guaranteed to receive superannuation contributions from their employer 
without any action on their part, meaning that they would have an income 
stream at retirement. It was a way to ensure that all workers were able to enjoy 
the benefits of superannuation. However, this model greatly limited choice. By 
allowing employers or unions to decide upon which superannuation fund 
contributions were to be invested meant that employees ended up with no say 
on where and how their money would actually be invested. While Paul Keating 
believed his policy implementation was the best way to fulfil his vision of a 
system with efficiency and equity, the Howard Government, elected in 1996, 
held a different view. The Howard Government saw individual choice as a vital 
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component of a good nation (Brett, 2006). As a result of this differing 
intellectual paradigm, in 2004 the Howard Government introduced the 
Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Fund) Act. This 
new legislation meant that employees were now given a choice as to which 
superannuation fund they wanted their employer to contribute to 
(Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) 
Act , 2004). While employees do not have to exercise this choice (they can opt 
for the employers default fund choice) simply providing employees with this 
choice has increased the complexity of the superannuation process (ACCI, 2005, 
p. 1). There is nothing inherently wrong with offering choice. The problem 
occurs when individuals do not have sufficient information, or are not able to 
process that information, so that they can exercise that choice. In this instance, a 
lack of financial literacy leads to an inability to make a choice. And the choice of 
superannuation fund is not the only choice an individual can make, it is simply 
the first. Once a fund has been selected, the individual has a choice of which 
investment portfolio to invest their money. On average, superannuation funds 
offer 33 investment options (Gittins, 2010). However, these 33 options are only 
the standard bundles, individuals can opt to choose their own level of 
investment in the different areas offered by the superannuation fund, picking 
from Australian shares, International shares, property, fixed interest and cash – 
to name just the standard options. What becomes clear by looking at all these 
choices is the large amount of financial knowledge an individual would need to 
have in order to make them. The problem of course is that the majority of 
Australians do not have this financial knowledge, and so the superannuation 
process becomes far from simple. 
When Australia, like the majority of the world, began to deregulate financial 
markets in the 1980s, it was inevitable that individuals of those countries would 
need to become more involved in matters of finance and the economy in 
general. By deregulating their economies, nations were essentially shifting the 
risk associated with economic decisions away from the state, and towards the 
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individual. Before deregulation, the nation state protected its citizenry from 
economic shocks, as best it could. For instance, currency markets were either 
fixed or pegged, providing certainty in regards to the value of the national 
currency and, as such, reducing the risk of fluctuation in product prices. 
Likewise, the banking sector was also heavily regulated meaning individuals 
did not have to worry about a loss of savings due to a banking crisis. This 
certainty disappeared after the deregulation programme was complete. This 
meant that individuals were no longer protected by the state but were now 
subject to the whims of global economic conditions. While this affected people 
in relation to currency fluctuations (product prices) and banking (cost of 
interest), the introduction of compulsory superannuation meant individuals 
were also exposed to fluctuations in global markets in respect to their 
retirement investments. In order to manage this new level of risk, individuals 
needed to become financially literate. The economic paradigm at the time of 
deregulation, and the one that influenced subsequent governments, believed 
that individuals, being rational decision makers, would be able to take in this 
new situation and process all the information so as to make correct decisions 
given all of the choices (Orhler & Werner, 2008, p. 254). The problem is people 
are not rational decision makers. Rather than all individuals making rational 
decisions, there is a large proportion of Australians who do not have 
appropriate levels of financial knowledge to make the necessary decisions to 
offset this new risk. This is most clearly seen with superannuation.  
There is now so much choice in the world of superannuation that it has led to, 
what I term, a two tiered system, those who possess the required levels of 
financial literacy to make the relevant choices, and those so confused by the 
system that they become apathetic towards it. Unfortunately, the vast majority 
of Australians fall into the second tier. A report commissioned by the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission found that the majority of 
Australians thought very little about superannuation until they were reaching 
the retirement age. Coinciding with this apathy towards the superannuation 
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system was a mild scepticism about its security, with many questioning 
whether they should invest all their retirement savings into superannuation 
(ASIC, 2004, p. 2). This apathy and scepticism is particularly prevalent amongst 
the youth of Australia. Many young people are confused by the superannuation 
system and also believe it is not something they need to care about, not yet at 
least. In fact many young Australians actually see home ownership as a more 
important aspect of setting up for their retirement than they do contributing to 
the superannuation system (Gittins, 2010). This view no doubt comes from a 
history of home ownership in Australia, and the status homes have as a high 
valued asset, one which increases dramatically in price. Since 1987, housing 
prices in Australia have increased almost 150% in real terms (factoring in 
inflation). As a comparison, Britain‟s housing market increased 70% and the US 
market 40% over the same time period (The Economist, 2010). As such, the idea 
that home ownership is a solid investment for one‟s retirement has some 
credibility in Australia. Of course, how long this can last, considering 
Australia‟s housing prices are around 7.5 times higher than the average 
Australian income is a pressing concern  (Grantham, 2010), and not one that can 
be adequately addressed here. What all this has led to is a great deal of 
Australians (not only the youth) either opting for home ownership as a means 
of „superannuation‟ (which, going by the statistics, is a risky endeavour), or 
being overwhelmed by the superannuation system, ignoring  it entirely and as 
such keeping their super at the standard, default option (Trembath, 2010). 
On the flip side are those who are well informed and well educated in financial 
matters and are able to make the choices available to them. The largest growing 
sector of the superannuation industry is Self Managed Superannuation Funds 
(SMSF) (ATO, 2007). A SMSF is basically a „do it yourself fund‟ whereby the 
individual controls the investment of superannuation contributions as well as 
the payment of benefits (ATO, 2010).This differs from a typical superannuation 
fund where the investment and payment is completed by a third party. While 
SMSFs are the fastest growing sector of the industry, this does not mean the 
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majority of Australians are moving towards this do it yourself model. To run a 
SMSF requires a high degree of financial literacy in order to invest wisely, a 
minimum of $200,000 in superannuation savings, as well as being able to cover 
the running costs (ASIC, 2009, p. 5). In other words, SMSFs are not for just 
anybody. SMSFs are not the only option for a financially literate individual. 
There is also the ability to remain with a traditional superannuation fund and 
choose from the range of investment options available to create an 
individualised investment portfolio. There are also taxation benefits for those 
with a higher degree of financial knowledge. A good example of this exists in 
the taxation benefits arising from salary sacrificing. If an individual is 
financially literate enough they can invest a portion of their income into their 
superannuation fund, which lowers the tax they would pay on that amount of 
income (Sampson, 2010). This is obviously a great incentive to invest in 
superannuation, and a great way to increase one‟s retirement income, but one 
which many individuals are simply not aware of and as such miss out on.    
There is a clear inequality in the current superannuation system as it currently 
stands. By creating such a complex system that requires a high degree of 
financial knowledge to be able to make the choices to improve one‟s 
superannuation, Australia has essentially created a two-tiered model where the 
majority of Australians are not able to receive the true benefits of 
superannuation. While some are able to work the system to their advantage by 
understanding which investments to make, the majority of Australian‟s not 
only stick to traditional superannuation funds, but also do not deviate from the 
default option offered by these funds, with approximately 80% choosing this 
option (Graham, 2009). In fact, the system has become so complicated for most 
Australians that there is $13.6 billion dollars (or about $400 per person) of „lost‟ 
superannuation in the system – meaning people have opened multiple 
accounts, not known how to transfer these funds, and simply forgotten about 
them (Blue, 2010). In this sense, superannuation has not proven to be good for 
the people as its complexity has created an intellectual entry barrier requiring 
 38 
 
financial knowledge which most Australians do not have, or are now too 
apathetic to learn about.  
Greater Income in Retirement:  cost, security and fund 
performance 
The barriers to entry of the superannuation system are not the only reason it is 
not good for the people. The other promise made of the superannuation system 
was that it would allow individuals to retire with large retirement incomes. 
Like the promise of simplicity, this promise has also been broken; to analyse 
how and why means looking at three interconnected issues. These are the cost, 
security and general fund performance of superannuation. Each of these issues 
will be addressed in turn.  
The cost of superannuation is an interesting one. Superannuation is more than 
just the savings of an individual over the course of their lifetime. What makes 
superannuation so appealing is that individual savings are invested, growing 
that pool of savings wealth instead of having it sit in a bank and as such loosing 
value due to inflation. This task of investment is passed on to private funds, 
which are not only better equipped with the knowledge of how to invest, but 
have the added benefit of lots of people‟s retirement savings at their disposal, 
meaning they can make larger and more aggressive investments than a lone 
individual could. However, having these private superannuation funds invest 
on behalf of individuals does come at a price. Before going on it is important to 
re-iterate the different types of superannuation funds in Australia. There are 
two main groupings of superannuation funds, those that are run for profit, 
which include retail and corporate funds, and those that are run not-for-profit, 
which include industry and public sector funds. Retail and industry funds 
make up the largest portion of the superannuation industry in Australia. 
Needless to say, no matter what category of fund, all superannuation funds 
serve the same purpose and generally offer the same services. 
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When canvassing the price various funds charge for investing an individual‟s 
savings, it is interesting to see the price charged track quite consistently along 
the profit/not-for-profit line. For instance, retail and corporate funds charged 
on average 1.19% to 1.86% p.a. for this service, whereas industry and public 
sector funds charged on average 0.67% to 0.94% p.a (Chant West, 2008, p. 2). 
This difference is obviously due to the fact that retail and corporate funds are 
designed to turn a profit, and must answer not only to their customers (the 
individual investing their savings) but also to shareholders. What is interesting 
to note is that industry superannuation fund fees, which are known for lower 
fees and not paying commission to financial advisers (Weaven, 2006), have 
actually been increasing since 2005 (Chant West, 2008, p. 4). While they are not 
at the levels of retail fund fees (the highest of all funds), it does shorten the gap 
between retail and industry superannuation funds. Another cost, often 
somewhat hidden, is that many default funds, even those from industry funds, 
charge insurance premiums for death and disability insurance (Kehl, 2000). The 
problem is an individual may not be aware of this, and may not even want or 
require it if they are already covered by some other form of private insurance. 
Nevertheless, people in these default funds can be charged almost $3 a week for 
a service they may not be aware of or even need (McIlwraith, 2010). 
It may appear unfair to criticise the superannuation industry for charging fees, 
and admittedly small percentages of fees, and to conclude that this is an 
argument for superannuation not being good for the people. However, by 
simply paying 1% in fees each year, an individual could lose up to 20% of their 
total retirement savings over a 30 year period (ASIC, 2010). Likewise with 
insurance premiums, $3 a week may not sound like much, but over that same 
30 year period, that amounts to $4,680 out of that persons retirement savings. 
As such, these „small‟ fees really do add up. And as these savings are not just 
leisure savings for a bit of extra spending, but are vital for an individual to have 
a comfortable retirement, these fees pose a great threat to the potential size of 
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an individual‟s retirement income and as such to the benefit people can get out 
of superannuation.  
The security of superannuation, and by that I mean whether individuals will 
receive their superannuation entitlements in full and on time (Stanford, 2003, p. 
80), is also an important issue when assessing the promise of a larger retirement 
income and as such how good superannuation is for the people. In Australia, 
the goal is to get all workers to utilise the superannuation system for their 
retirement needs. Among other more visionary goals, a simple rationale for this 
move is to take the pressure of retirement funding off the federal budget. 
Australia‟s superannuation system has three pillars: compulsory 
superannuation, individual contributions, and the public pension. Before 
Keating‟s 1992 superannuation policy (prior to the three pillar system being 
officially implemented), the main form of retirement income for workers was 
from the public pension. For years this worked well, with individuals able to 
retire, comfortable in the knowledge that the government was there to support 
them. Throughout an individual‟s life, they could, if they chose, put some extra 
money away for retirement, but that was not a necessity. However, the 
population began to dramatically increase, and governments began to realise 
that they would soon be faced with an ageing population which would increase 
the cost of retirement funding, something the budget would not be able to 
handle. The solution to this came in the form of superannuation as we know it 
today, where it is the individual who is responsible for the money they will 
have come retirement. This raises the question of security. While previously it 
was the government that ensured a flow of income to individuals in retirement, 
now that role was moved to the financial institutions (the superannuation 
funds) with whom an individual invests. In other words, the security of an 
individual‟s retirement has shifted from the public to the private sector. This 
shift alone was not the only cause for concern. Alongside this shift came the 
move to invest an individual‟s retirement savings into the marketplace. As 
stated previously, this was seen as a way to further increase the size of an 
 41 
 
individual‟s portfolio. However, with this potential gain, there is also the 
potential for loss. 
In 2008, the superannuation industry experienced this potential flipside. 2008 
was of course the year of the Global Financial Crisis, the year when several of 
the world‟s investment banks and insurance agencies collapsed (or almost 
collapsed). The nature of global finance meant that superannuation funds that 
may not have directly invested in the „toxic‟ assets that led to the crisis in the 
first place, were still hit with the flow on effects of a crashing world market. The 
result was sharp losses for superannuation funds – or in other words, for the 
retirement savings of Australians. By April of 2008, $70 billion dollars had been 
wiped from the total value of superannuation in Australia (Pryor, 2008). By the 
year‟s end, the industry was down 17.6% (Graham, 2009). What all this means is 
that the portfolios of individuals actually decreased dramatically during the 
crisis. Superannuation funds were quick to point out that superannuation is a 
long term investment, and that while the losses were bad, it was no reason to 
panic or lose faith in the industry. While this rationale may hold true for 
younger people, it provides little comfort for those already nearing retirement 
who have just seen a large portion of their savings wiped off which they may 
not be able to regain before retirement all because they were forced to put their 
trust in the superannuation industry. By shifting the onus of security for an 
individual‟s retirement savings from the state onto the private sector that then 
invests this money in the global market, creates an unnecessary and unfair risk, 
which at the end of the day, only harms the individual should things go wrong.  
The final issue that calls into question the promise that superannuation would 
lead to an increased retirement income for each individual and as such make 
superannuation good for the people is the issue of general fund performance. 
Rather than simply save retirement money in a bank, where it would not earn 
anything, but rather would lose value due to inflation, the Australian 
superannuation system is set up so that those savings are invested in the 
market, with the hopes of achieving strong returns. This chapter has already 
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explored the security issue that goes along with this model. What this section 
hopes to elucidate is whether superannuation funds are actually the best 
method of growing an individual‟s retirement savings. The previous section 
already identified, via the example of the global financial crisis, that 
superannuation funds are subject to the whims of the global market place, and, 
as such, a positive return on investment is not guaranteed. Since Keating‟s 
implementation of the superannuation policy in 1992, superannuation funds 
have had several „bad‟ years. As mentioned, the superannuation industry 
counters any suggestion that these „bad‟ years indicate that superannuation is a 
bad investment by pointing out the long term nature of superannuation. The 
argument normally goes something along the lines that superannuation funds 
aim for a high average return which is achieved by making investments which 
“yield high returns in many years but which produce the occasional year of 
negative returns” (Valentine, 2003, p. 110). So the argument is that overall, in 
the long term, superannuation will produce the best results. The problem with 
this argument is that it is not correct. The average yearly growth of 
superannuation between 1997 and 2010 was 3.04%. To put this figure into 
context, the rate of inflation during that same period averaged 2.8%, meaning 
the real average growth rate of superannuation was 0.24% (Long, 2010). What 
this means is that the „real‟ growth of superannuation over the long term is 
almost (and if you exclude 1997-1999, actually is) non-existent. These statistics 
don‟t include the fees paid for these investment services, or the money lost in 
inactive funds due to the complexity of the system. Were they to be factored in, 
there would most likely be no real gain at all. What is even more startling is that 
if all the money that was invested with superannuation funds over that period 
had been invested in a ten year Australian Treasury bond, the average growth 
rate would have been 5.75% (Long, 2010). What these figures identify is that the 
final argument for superannuation‟s promise to deliver larger retirement 
incomes is simply not true.  
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Paul Keating‟s vision for the Australian superannuation system was for it to be 
good for the people. The idea was that a system would be implemented that 
would be simple and effective enough that all Australians would be able to 
partake and as such have a comfortable retirement. Keating worked hard with 
Bill Kelty, then head of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, to implement 
the superannuation system we have today. Kelty, like Keating, shared the view 
that all Australian‟s needed a strong retirement savings system, so helped 
convince the trade union movement, which was a far mightier force at the time 
and represented considerably more Australian workers than it does today2, to 
support Keating‟s vision (ABS, 1997). Sadly however, theses lofty and noble 
ideals were failed by poor policy. It seems that Kelty did his membership a 
disservice by supporting the Superannuation Policy as it has proven to be far 
from good for the people. To begin with, the system is unnecessarily complex. 
This creates a two tiered system in which a small minority are able to use the 
system to their advantage, while the overwhelming majority are left with 
multitudes of choices and options, and no clue of what to pick. 
The result is that most Australian‟s select the default option (which is rarely the 
best performing) and also end up with hundreds of dollars missing in lost 
superannuation funds from changing employment, and thus changing funds. 
But this complexity is not all. The system was also meant to allow workers to 
retire with a large retirement income. However, this has not proven to be the 
case. The superannuation system turns out to be expensive in terms of fees, 
which must be paid in order to have an individual‟s money invested by these 
private superannuation funds which, as legislated, is compulsory. Having paid 
fees for these services, individuals then expect their money to be wisely 
invested and thus grow during the course of their working life. Yet, 
superannuation funds are regularly hit by „bad‟ times as a result of the 
fluctuating global marketplace, which, over time leads to a fairly lacklustre rate 
                                                          
2
 Approximately 42% of the Australian population in 1992 
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of growth, barely above inflation. The result is that individuals are left with 
much less upon retirement than promised. 
Regardless of these realities, the superannuation system continues to be 
vehemently defended by its proponents. The most vocal of these is the system‟s 
architect, Paul Keating. For years Keating has urged government to increase the 
compulsory contribution rate from 9% to 15% (Anne, 2007). This, according to 
Keating, would cement the success of the superannuation system for the 
people. However, as this chapter has sought to demonstrate, the system thus far 
has been far from successful. It begs the question then, what would be the result 
of an increase in the compulsory contribution rate. Keating claims it would 
increase the amount of money individuals will have come retirement. If we 
assume that regulations stay as they currently are, then just like the promise 
made in 1992, this promise will also be broken. Considering the history of 
superannuation‟s growth rates and fluctuations due to market conditions, there 
is no guarantee that individuals would actually see more money come 
retirement. In fact I would argue that the only beneficiaries of an increase in the 
compulsory Superannuation Guarantee would be the superannuation funds 
themselves, who would now have more money to invest. What all this means is 
that Paul Keating‟s superannuation policy, his vision that it would be good for 
the people, has failed to live up to the reality of the situation, and any proposed 
changes to the system like an increase in the Superannuation Guarantee are 
unlikely to change this. In its current state, superannuation seems to be good 
only for a very select few people, those with the knowledge to use the system, 
and those who run the superannuation funds. For the rest of the Australian 
people, the superannuation system is a complex, costly and underperforming 
reality of everyday life.  
  
 
 45 
 
Chapter Four: A Vision Shifted? 
In 1992, the Australian people were promised great things by the Keating 
superannuation proposal. It would be the greatest reform for workers, a policy 
to lay the groundwork for a better, richer, and more comfortable and secure 
Australia. Eighteen years later, Australia must face up to the harsh reality that 
these promises have not been fulfilled. An outsider looking at today‟s 
superannuation system would be at odds to reconcile the 1992 vision with the 
2010 outcomes. The vision of a better nation brought about by superannuation 
has shifted. Sadly, it has not been a shift in the right direction. In August 2009, 
the Rudd Labor Government commissioned a report into the state of 
superannuation in Australia, to be chaired by Jeremy Cooper. On July 5th 2010, 
Cooper handed down the report findings. At the official tabling of the Cooper 
Review of Superannuation the minister for Superannuation, Chris Bowen, 
commented that the purpose and outlook of the Cooper Review was clear: to 
make “superannuation good for individual Australians and very good for the 
nation” (Bowen, 2010). In a way, it was an admission (although unintentional) 
of how far the vision has shifted, that the Cooper Review‟s intention was to 
make superannuation exactly what Keating promised it would be eighteen 
years earlier. This chapter will examine the report and the proposed changes to 
the superannuation system as a means of assessing the future for 
superannuation. In eighteen years, Australia has seen a vision unfulfilled. What 
is important now is to assess whether that vision can ever become a reality.   
I have argued that there were two main promises made of the Australian 
superannuation system by Paul Keating in 1992, in simple terms, that 
superannuation would be good for the nation and good for the people. While 
others focus on pragmatic motives, for instance wage relations and inflation 
issues, I have focused on these broader issues which I believe Keating saw as 
integral to building a better nation, and which superannuation would be used 
to achieve. It was these two promises which were sold to the Australian people. 
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The previous two chapters have examined in detail why these claims have not 
turned out to be correct. While the promises were split above for the purpose of 
analysis, it is fair to say that both promises are inextricably linked. In other 
words, good for the people and good for the nation are two sides of the same 
coin. In general terms, the superannuation system has failed to boost 
infrastructure projects, protect the Australian economy and provide a simple, 
high growth option for individuals to invest their retirement savings. As such it 
is fair to say that superannuation has not been good for the nation and good for 
the people. While this is problematic in its own right, what makes the situation 
all the more dire is that superannuation in its current state is actually becoming 
harmful. This is more the case for people rather than for the nation. By creating 
a system that is so complex and prone to market shocks, people are actually 
forced, due to the compulsory nature of the Australian system, to invest their 
money into a system that may not provide them with the security that is 
essential for an individual‟s retirement savings. For superannuation to be 
successful, it must be easily accessible for all workers and ensure that the 
money invested is returned to individuals at retirement. Currently, this is not 
the case. Not only is it too complex and requires too high a level of financial 
knowledge to make suitable choices, but the real growth rates on investment 
are in some cases producing negative results. Yet this is the system that has 
been implemented, and the one which is continuing to take over the role of the 
public pension. What is clear from the argument so far is that the Australian 
Superannuation system is flawed. Far from living up to the promises of 1992, 
which would have made superannuation a success, it looks more like it has 
become the great superannuation swindle – bad for the nation, bad for the 
people.  
The future of the superannuation system is unclear. In July 2010, Jeremy Cooper 
completed and submitted his report into the state of superannuation in 
Australia. In his report he identified several problems with superannuation as 
well as listing numerous possible changes that could improve it. While little 
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progress has been made on these recommendations, the report represents the 
clearest insight into the superannuation zeitgeist, an indication of how 
superannuation is perceived and the possibilities for its improvement. The 
Cooper Review approached the issue of superannuation from a different 
theoretical standpoint to the current economic orthodoxy. While it 
acknowledged the existence of mainstream theory that states free markets 
efficiently allocate resources via competition, and as such that the private free 
market industry of superannuation should produce the optimum results, the 
report argues that this does not apply to the Australian superannuation system. 
There are numerous reasons for this argument, many of which reflect the 
criticisms I made of superannuation failing to live up to its promise to be good 
for the people. For instance, there are the issues that go along with the 
complexity of the system highlighted in chapter three, in that individuals often 
do not make the choice of fund but simply select the default employer fund. 
Likewise, there is a lack of interest towards superannuation amongst 
individuals until they are almost ready to retire. There is also the fact that the 
compulsory contributed amount does not come directly out of an individual‟s 
pocket, but is completed on the employer side, which furthers the lack of 
interest and awareness of the system. In other words, approaching the issue of 
superannuation from a critical, non-mainstream perspective, the review panel 
were able to identify several keys issues with superannuation. From this 
standpoint, the review panel were able to propose changes to the current 
system which are designed to make superannuation good for the people. 
Armed with the knowledge that superannuation has proved so far to not be 
good for the people, that the orthodox „leave it to the free market‟ approach has 
not worked, the Cooper Review put forward some recommendations to 
improve the Australian superannuation system. The review recommended that 
the entire superannuation system be restructured to implement what the review 
calls the „Choice Architecture Model‟ (Cooper, 2010, p. 10). This new structure 
would split the superannuation system into three regulated areas. The first, and 
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largest, would be called „MySuper‟. The aim of MySuper is to address the 
majority of issues raised previously which highlight the failings of the current 
superannuation system. MySuper would become the „default‟ option that 
individuals were allocated if they did not make a choice. Rather than suffer 
from an inadequate level of performance like current default fund types do, the 
MySuper fund would be regulated so that trustees (those that run the fund) are 
required to deliver a high quality product without high fees. As such, 
individuals would no longer be inadvertently punished due to their inaction. 
Clearly the MySuper option is aimed at those who do not care about or are too 
disillusioned and apathetic about the superannuation system, as well as those 
that are aware, but simply want a “large, low-cost, well managed product” 
(Cooper, 2010, p. 11). While this would make up the majority of Australians, it 
is obviously not for everyone. 
A key component of the Australian system has been to allow individuals 
choice, something the Cooper Review did not want to remove. As such, there 
are two more fund options as part of the reviews „Choice Architecture Model‟: 
„Choice‟ and „Self Managed Super Funds‟. The „Choice‟ sector of this new 
model, unlike the MySuper fund option, is not a prescriptive sector. It works 
like the current system works in that an individual may choose a different set of 
investment options for their superannuation investment rather than remain 
with the default option. The difference with the new „Choice‟ model is that this 
sector would have stricter regulations imposed. Rather than the onus of 
financial literacy being solely on the individual, this model would allow 
regulators such as the Australia Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) or the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to assess the 
investment options offered by the fund. This would provide independent 
information and ratings of these options so that an individual may not 
inadvertently invest in a financial product that is not suitable for long term 
retirement savings investment (Cooper, 2010, pp. 11-12). In other words this 
new „Choice‟ model still provides the choice that the existing model does, but 
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provides greater assistance to individuals rather than assuming they are able to 
gather and process all the relevant information so as to make correct decisions. 
„Self Managed Super Funds‟ are the final sector of the proposed model and 
work in the same way as they currently do. They are available for individuals 
who want even greater choice, flexibility and control over their superannuation 
and have the financial knowledge and funds to do this.  
The Cooper Review‟s proposed superannuation model is designed to 
counteract the failings of the current superannuation model. It does not re-
invent the wheel with a vastly different system, but rather works within the 
current confines of Australia‟s system, that being a privately run, individual 
choice based system, and tweaks existing legislation and regulation in order to 
improve it. In chapter three I argued that the current superannuation model 
had created a two tiered system. The bottom tier consisted of the majority of 
Australians who felt superannuation was too complicated and as such had 
tuned out, sticking with their employers default fund, and the default 
investment option of that fund. The second tier consisted of those with the 
financial knowledge to understand and make choices within the 
superannuation system. While the Cooper Review‟s proposed model does not 
wholly eliminate the tiered system, it does blur the lines and make the system 
far more equitable. Under the Cooper model, an individual is no longer 
penalised for not making a choice. Rather, it is assumed that the majority will 
remain with the default option, and as such the default option has been greatly 
improved. Regulations have also been strengthened so that the risk of losing 
retirement savings decreases. Likewise, those willing to learn more about 
investment options are not left on their own, but rather supported by regulatory 
bodies which will provide digestible information on investment options. So 
while on the surface the proposed Cooper Review model may not seem overly 
dissimilar from the current system, the underlying philosophy of the Cooper 
Review model is vastly different. The Cooper Review model does not assume 
individuals are rational self maximisers, nor does it assume a high degree of 
 50 
 
financial knowledge. Rather, it takes a self proclaimed “libertarian paternalism” 
standpoint, legislating for the lowest financial literacy level, ensuring an equal 
coverage for all Australians, while also allowing for choice within the system 
(Cooper, 2010, p. 9). In other words, it aims to transform a system that has failed 
the majority of people, and turn it into one that will actually live up to Paul 
Keating‟s promise.  
Of course, Keating did not only promise that superannuation would be good 
for the people. The other aspect of the vision was that superannuation would be 
good for the nation. In chapter two I assessed the claims that went with this 
promise, that superannuation would help protect the Australian economy from 
external shocks, and that the large pool of savings would be used to fund 
infrastructure investment. Given the current economic system in which we live, 
the overly nationalist idea that superannuation savings could help protect the 
Australian economy cannot co-exist in a world of globalised financial markets. 
As such this is not a promise that can be kept with the current system. That 
leaves the idea that superannuation would help fund infrastructure investment. 
While Chris Bowen stated at the launch of the Cooper Review that its purpose 
was to make superannuation good for the people and the nation, this did not 
include a model to make superannuation assist nation building. This does not 
mean that no work has been done in this area. On the contrary, this is an area 
that has received considerable attention from government and the private 
sector. This literature generally begins with the assumption that Paul Keating 
made, that the large pool of savings generated out of superannuation could be 
used to fund infrastructure investment – that it in fact seemed the perfect fit. At 
the time Keating made these claims, this seemed like a fair enough point, given 
the way Macquarie Bank was utilising the newly available superannuation 
finances. However, the use of superannuation funds for infrastructure has 
dwindled to incredibly low levels. The problem is that infrastructure funds 
have been told that they must make the most prudent and well performing 
investment decisions available to them. While infrastructure is often a stable 
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long term investment, it pales in comparison to the returns available from new 
financial products such as derivatives. Basically, the way the superannuation 
system in Australia was set up was based on the assumption that these private 
funds would actually invest in nation building infrastructure without actually 
regulating for this. The result of course has been for superannuation funds to 
invest in more liquid and less costly assets (Nielson, 2005).  
Unfortunately it is now not simply a matter of regulating that superannuation 
funds should invest in infrastructure projects. To rectify this failing of the 
system, it must be approached in the same way the Cooper Review approached 
the failing of superannuation for the people – working within the confines of 
the system but from a different philosophical mindset. History has shown us 
that these private superannuation funds will not, of their own accord, invest 
heavily in infrastructure. So legislating with that assumption in mind will be 
unsuccessful. Instead, government must adopt the mindset that, left up to the 
market, private enterprise will not invest in nation building infrastructure. A 
possible policy solution would be to clear up and tighten regulation of the 
infrastructure industry. The uncertainty around regulation of new 
infrastructure industries, such as technology, water or carbon markets, means 
that superannuation funds are less willing to invest in these areas. More 
importantly, the government could establish an infrastructure body in order to 
centralise the process for investing in infrastructure projects. This would help 
provide certainty for superannuation fund investors as the projects are then 
seen as a national initiative and less likely to be abandoned, or fail. However, 
the government can do more than this. With the establishment of a national 
infrastructure body, the government could even issue infrastructure bonds, 
which the superannuation funds could invest in, again simplifying the process 
of investing in national infrastructure (Ernst & Young, 2009, pp. 8-10). With 
measures such as these, infrastructure would become more attractive to 
superannuation funds, and would allow the superannuation system to fulfil the 
role that Keating envisaged for it. 
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The system of superannuation in Australia, established in 1992, was far from 
perfect. While it is hard to say it has been warmly embraced considering the 
shortcomings of the system, it is fair to say that it is generally accepted that the 
system is here to stay. It is of course not without possible contenders. To many 
policy makers pre 1980s, the mere idea of a privately run system such as 
Australia has implemented seemed absurd. A possible alternative, as suggested 
by Keith Hancock to the Whitlam government in the 1970s, was a system in 
which superannuation savings were kept in public hands. Hancock suggested a 
model in which a progressive income tax for superannuation was placed on 
each individual, and paid into consolidated revenue. The portion paid by each 
individual was set aside for them, with a real (meaning taking inflation into 
account) interest rate payment of 1% per annum added to this sum, which 
would provide a defined benefit to each individual (Davidson, 2007, pp. 3-4). 
This money would be a supplement to the public pension under the Hancock 
model. Such notions of public models died off quickly, as theories of 
government involvement in the economy changed, as well as the growing 
concern that even a public model such as Hancock‟s could not be sustained by 
the federal budget with a growing and ageing population. By 1992, the prospect 
of a public system seemed like distant, naïve thought. The future of retirement 
funding would come through the private sector; the only question was what 
form that would take. It was Paul Keating who finally chose what form that 
would be. Keating knew what he wanted to achieve from the superannuation 
system. It was part of his big picture for Australia, to make Australia a greater 
nation going into the new millennium. If a system could be implemented that 
utilised the market, while also providing for the nation and for the people, then 
it would help to relax the governments direct role in this area and thus free up 
the government to pursue the progressive social agenda that Keating also saw 
as vital – it was all interconnected. 
What Australia was left with though is a thoroughly flawed system. It has been 
the purpose of this paper to identify these failings, to analyse the promise and 
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present the reality. What should not be overlooked however are the ideas that 
underpin Keating‟s system. The ideas behind Australia‟s superannuation 
system, simplified into two broad categories: to create a better nation, to 
provide for the people, were grand, noble and even visionary. They are the 
ideas that make a great social democracy – legislating for a better nation for the 
betterment of the people. Superannuation was supposed to be the driver of this, 
the system that made it all possible. While this paper has demonstrated that it 
has failed at achieving this goal, this chapter has sought to highlight that all is 
not lost. What is required is taking those ideas of Keating and applying them to 
policy, but from a different philosophical mindset; tweaking the current policy, 
rather than re-inventing and re-creating a new system to put in its place. This is 
what the Cooper Review of Superannuation has done, and what could also be 
achieved in regards to infrastructure investment. The Cooper Review is 
working within the confines of a broken system – but with new eyes and new 
ideas. What the Cooper Review does is mould an unfair and unequal system 
into one which works for all Australians, not just those with the financial 
knowledge to utilise the system, or those that run the superannuation funds 
themselves. 
Likewise, all is not lost for the superannuation industry and infrastructure 
investment. The trillion dollar industry that is the superannuation system could 
easily be put to use creating nation building infrastructure, it just takes a 
different mindset. To make superannuation good for the nation and good for 
the people means abandoning notions of market infallibility. It means accepting 
that private enterprise will not necessarily work towards the social good. And it 
means having the willingness to legislate for change in an industry, despite the 
vested interests. 
To reconcile Paul Keating‟s vision with reality will take more than the small, 
and in the end, pointless gestures which have been proposed. Calls for an 
increase to the Superannuation Guarantee serve no one but those who have 
benefited all along, the superannuation funds. This type of pseudo-policy will 
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only exacerbate the problems of the superannuation system. The idea that 
superannuation can be good for the nation and good for the people is still a 
plausible one, but to make it a reality will require a shift in thinking, and 
possibly even a shift in vision. 
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Conclusion 
Unlike most ex-Australian Prime Ministers, Paul Keating is quick to enter into 
public policy debate. On no topic is he more vocal than superannuation policy, 
which makes sense considering he was the architect of the system Australia has 
in place today. While Keating had pragmatic motivations in mind when 
implementing this system, such as concerns of continual wage increases and the 
pressure this put on inflation, it is naïve to think these were the only concerns. 
Paul Keating was a believer in big picture politics. To borrow a phrase from Bill 
Kelty, a co-architect of sorts of the superannuation system, Keating was a 
„romantic‟ of politics – a believer in some positive ideal of good (Kelty, 2009). It 
is from this ideological mindset, I argue, that Keating created and implemented 
Australia‟s superannuation system. So while pragmatic concerns were of course 
a factor, the idea that superannuation could achieve some greater end goal – to 
improve the nation, to provide for the people, was at the heart of the policy. For 
Keating, the superannuation system was the foundation upon which his big 
picture could flourish. A better nation needed better infrastructure and 
economic security, something that the superannuation system would provide. 
By creating a large pool of savings, superannuation would allow investors to 
borrow domestically as opposed to overseas, and as such limit Australia‟s 
exposure to foreign debt. Likewise that same pool of funds could be used to 
invest in new, nation building infrastructure which would be vital in 
catapulting Australia onto the world stage, and not simply remaining an 
insignificant nation at, to quote Keating‟s infamous phrase, the „arse end of the 
world‟. Of course, the superannuation system would bring social benefits as 
well. The system would provide a simple, uniform model that all Australian‟s 
would have access to. By using the private sector to invest individual‟s savings, 
the system could provide a higher growth rate and as such larger retirement 
incomes to individuals than the federally funded public pension ever could. 
These were the ideas underpinning Australia‟s superannuation system. They 
were also the promises made to the Australian people.  
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Eighteen years later, it has become clear that these promises were never 
fulfilled. Superannuation has not proven to be good for the nation. While the 
savings pool created out of the superannuation system has been used for 
borrowing, it has not stopped individuals from borrowing overseas and 
opening Australia up to external economic shocks. The idea that 
superannuation savings would protect the Australian economy was based on a 
nationalist idea and as such was incompatible with the new globalised context 
Australia found itself in. The deeply interconnected nature of derivates markets 
and multination corporations have obscured and complicated the figures that 
these claims were based on. As such, claims that the balance of payments and 
the current account deficit would be helped by the large pool of superannuation 
savings are simply untrue. 
 Superannuation is not assisting with nation building infrastructure either. 
While superannuation was supposed to lead to an increase in the building of 
Australian infrastructure by investing retirement savings into these projects, the 
reality is that superannuation invests only small amounts into such areas. While 
the actual amount invested by each fund varies, as a whole, the superannuation 
system invests less than 3% into Australian infrastructure. The main reason 
why is that these privately run funds have no regulations imposed upon them 
to invest in infrastructure, and instead choose to invest in other financial 
products which have the potential to produce higher returns, benefiting both 
their customers, as well as their shareholders in the case of the retail 
superannuation funds. The failure of both of these policy promises has meant 
that superannuation as it currently exists in Australia is not benefiting the 
nation as a whole. 
Sadly, the same is true for the claims that superannuation would be good for 
the people. Rather than provide a simple and cost effective way to grow 
retirement savings, the superannuation system has turned into an unnecessarily 
complex, costly, unsafe and poor performing system. The financial literacy level 
required to properly utilise superannuation in Australia has meant the creation 
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of a two tiered system, a minority who can use and benefit from the system, 
and the overwhelming majority who are so confused by it that their retirement 
savings are actually in danger of producing real losses at maturity. In its current 
state, the superannuation system is in no way good for the people.  
One purpose of this paper was to track and assess the state of superannuation 
in Australia today, compared to the promises made by Paul Keating of that 
system in 1992. What the paper has shown is a stark gap between what was 
promised and what was delivered. From the analysis presented, one could 
easily draw the conclusion that superannuation in Australia is a flawed and 
corrupted system. That assessment would not be entirely incorrect. However, 
when analysing Australia‟s superannuation system, it is important to look 
beyond the actual policy that was implemented, to the ideas that created it. The 
system was imagined at a time when Australia was finding its feet in a new 
economic world. The new Prime Minister Paul Keating had a clear vision for 
Australia‟s future that went beyond pure pragmatic policy. He saw the 
possibility of a better Australia, which would be made possible through a series 
of economic and social changes. Apart from the superannuation system, most of 
the economic changes had already been completed by the time he was Prime 
Minister, he had made sure of that during his time as treasurer under the 
Hawke Government. But it was not until Keating was Prime Minister that his 
social policies became a large part of the agenda. Of most significance was the 
reconciliation with the Indigenous Australians, and the seeking of cultural ties 
with Asia, yet there were of course several other social policies being 
implemented as well. Alongside these social policies was the last piece of 
Keating‟s economic reform and the final piece of the puzzle that would allow 
his social policies to flourish, his superannuation policy. 
The result of all this was that Keating and his government were left juggling 
several important policies at once. So rather than be able give the policies, in 
particular the superannuation policy, the attention they deserved, the 
government was focussed on pushing through with as many of these big 
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picture policies as possible. The casualty in all of this turned out to be the 
superannuation system. The poor implementation of the system meant it lacked 
the regulatory regime to ensure that the ideas could become a reality. Rather 
than implement a system that would see the flourishing of Keating‟s vision, 
Australia was left with a system that was doomed to fail. Successive 
governments would only make things worse as the rhetoric of „choice‟ 
infiltrated the lexicon, creating further complications and inequalities to a 
system already riddled with complexity. So, to conclude that Australia‟s 
superannuation system is a failure only scrapes the surface. Beyond the failed 
exterior of the system there are still the ideas which Keating envisaged eighteen 
years ago. In other words, what this paper has sought to highlight beyond an 
assessment of the promises and the reality, is that while the system itself is 
flawed, its foundations, the ideas upon which it was created, still exist. It is 
from these ideas that we can take some hope that the Australian 
superannuation system can be salvaged. 
This is where the work of Jeremy Cooper comes in. The Cooper Review of 
superannuation represents a step forward in salvaging the Australian 
superannuation system. The review concerns itself with the failure of the 
current system to be good for the people. By highlighting these failures it is able 
to propose an amended model that works within the guidelines of the current 
system. What makes the review‟s proposal so successful is that it take the ideas 
set out by the Keating vision, and approaches them from a different 
philosophical position to what Keating and his advisors did in 1992. Rather 
than assume that the market and private sector would provide the desired 
outcomes, the Cooper Review panel instead assumed that the market would fail 
and the private sector would not work in the best interests of all Australians. 
The result is a proposed system that is targeted at the lowest financial literacy 
level so as to increase the level of equality and efficiency of the system – an 
ideal that Keating always wanted to achieve. While the Cooper Review did not 
include proposals to make up for the failings of superannuation for the nation, 
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this does not mean that that promise cannot also be realised. Again, 
approaching the system from a different mindset, but with the same ideas 
proposed by Keating, it is possible to amend the system to be good for the 
nation. For instance governments can enforce regulations on infrastructure 
industries to create stability, or be proactive in promoting infrastructure 
investment to superannuation funds by creating and releasing infrastructure 
bonds. What these proposals, and those presented in the Cooper Review 
demonstrate, is that all is not lost for the Australian superannuation system. 
Paul Keating wants to be remembered, and most notably, wants to be 
remembered for his superannuation system. What this paper has shown is that 
his superannuation system is far from the perfect model he made it out to be. 
Eighteen years after Keating implemented his superannuation vision into 
policy, Australia is faced with a big decision. As the Cooper Review and 
proposals around infrastructure demonstrate, the Australian superannuation 
system can still be salvaged. It is up to the current federal government to act 
quickly, to seriously consider the proposals presented to them and reform this 
deeply flawed and in many ways dangerous system. While Paul Keating‟s 
vision has not become a reality, Australia currently has the opportunity to make 
it happen. 
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